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1. Background 
Since the first Thredbo conference in 1989, we have seen an explosion worldwide in reforms to 
the provision of local bus services. At each conference we identify additional locations 
beginning their reform agenda that involves, to varying degrees, a move away from a 
predominantly public monopoly supply, and a greater engagement in contracting reforms (see 
Hensher and Houghton 2004, Hensher 2007, Hensher and Stanley 2008, Bakker and van de 
Velde 2009, and Stanley and van de Velde 2009). These reforms vary from economic 
deregulation through to competitive tendering and negotiated contracts, with different amounts 
of performance-based prescription. Countries and jurisdictions within countries that have been 
engaged in institutional reforms in service delivery for many years are seen to sway back and 
forth between the regimes as they ‘learn’ from their own experiences as well the experiences of 
others.  As an example, we see a proposal to return to economic deregulation in Sweden, after 
having chosen the route of competitive tendering for the last 15 years; however it is economic 
deregulation with a twist1
As we look back at the diverse range of procurement and payment mechanisms used to contract 
the provision of bus services (see Wallis and Hensher 2007, Wallis et al. 2010), we can identify 
some core elements of the contract payment regime, around which various conditions are 
detailed. Despite the heterogeneity of such payment methods, core elements can be 
characterised by mixtures of demand and supply criteria as both baseline and incentive linked, 
to varying degrees.  
.   
Candidate models can be classified as:  
(i) A pure cost-based model associated with cost per bus kilometre and no patronage or 
service incentives,  
(ii) A hybrid model based on patronage allocation and residual cost per bus kilometre without 
incentives,  
(iii) A pure cost-based model with patronage and/or service incentives, and  
(iv) A hybrid model with patronage and/or service incentives. 
A pure cost-based model associated with cost per bus kilometre is typically the conversion of a 
total cost, and is determined by operating conditions and efficiency of scheduling.  Operating 
conditions vary for many reasons, but the key cost sources are average speed, spread of service 
hours over each weekday and weekend, vehicle utilisation2
                                                          
1 The Swedish Public Transport Authority (PTA) will design a services statement expressing demand for services, including 
strategic goals. Operators then apply for commercial based services, and the PTAs evaluate applications with respect to the goals 
set in the services statement. Some commercial traffic results and the non-commercial services will be tendered as Public Sector 
Obligations. This is controversial: there is a fear that co-ordinated services will be fragmented, that cherry picking will occur, and 
the prevention of cross-subsidy will increase costs to society. Some observers believe that this scheme is more about controlling 
cost than it is about improving services and increasing passengers. Some proponents believe that commercial and non-
commercial services can co-exist, just like the UK model outside of London; however this model is showing how it is easier to ‘cut’ 
services suggesting that the removal of cross subsidy may well have equity impacts in the provision of services under budget 
constraint. The New Zealand experience however has not been good, with commercial services focusing on the peaks, and non-
commercial tendered services in the off-peaks, where the latter is typically won by the incumbent peak service provider who tends 
to offload all shared costs to the tendered services, given the lack of competing bidders. 
, dead running time, fleet financing 
(noting that a contract under competitive regulation should have agreed terms of depreciation, 
risk and economic life of assets), and scheduling efficiency issues such as layovers between 
trips which are often influenced by the degree of union influence in scheduling, but which is 
likely to affect vehicle scheduling as well. 
2 Similar to the cost allocation formula used to use for costing contracts in Britain before competitive tendering, which allocated 
costs according to three variables - bus kilometres, bus hours, and peak vehicle requirements. 
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Patronage and service kilometre incentive payments also exist in a growing number of contracts, 
and are based on a range of approaches. In simple terms, the patronage incentive payment is 
linked to growth in patronage above an agreed benchmark; and service kilometres must be 
related to some gain in patronage otherwise it is an inefficient (and ineffective) cost driver.  
Some contracts are net and others are gross. A net contract is where operators retain fare box 
revenue and bid for, or negotiate a (net) subsidy. In contrast, under a gross contract an operator 
bids or negotiates for the total cost of operating a pre-specified service, and the Authority retains 
the fare box revenue. Performance incentives, more commonly aligned with gross contracts, are 
typically related to reliability and other input measures for service quality, but can also include 
patronage-based incentives. Allocating and managing the revenue risks and uncertainties is 
something that has to be agreed between the parties. Gross contracts have some advantages over 
net contracts; in particular they remove one of the barriers to entry, as new entrants3 generally 
have significantly less information (especially information on patronage and revenue potential) 
on which to base their tender or negotiated prices.  A gross contract also facilitates the 
introduction of integrated fares4
We have not seen a net cost tender where bidders were provided with an accurate picture of the 
current revenue and/or patronage. This means that net cost tenders will have a high risk 
premium for the bidders, and this in turn gives a strong advantage to the incumbent. That is in 
large measure how NZ Bus has been able to maintain their effective monopoly in Auckland and 
Wellington for so long. Net cost contracts also have a higher risk to "network integrity" where 
operators put too much focus on their own position (especially where it operates within and 
between contract areas) without considering their role as part of the wider network.  
 because it removes the need to allocate the revenue between 
operators and modes, but with gross contracts, the patronage-related risk is on the side of the 
Authority.  In contrast there is generally a greater incentive for patronage growth on the operator 
side if the contracts are net, because in keeping the farebox revenue, they gain from any 
additional passengers generated above the agreed contract estimate. 
In the following sections we set out a framework within which some ‘ideals’ for a generic and 
simple payment formula might be established, and used at least as the basis of a reference point 
to start negotiation and/or assessing tender bids. The main value of this is likely to be for 
government to benchmark operators on entering a negotiation or tendering process or for an 
industry association to do the same for its members (to see whose cost/profitability levels may 
need attention, one way or the other)5.The paper is also valuable in suggesting an objective way 
of assessing the costs of delivering bus services. This is critically important in critiquing 
existing systems and determining whether there is a justification for change of operator which 
can be disruptive, and for evaluating tenders.6
We demonstrate how the approach might work in a specific geographical location, with 
illustrative data used to calibrate weights that indicate the influence of factors that are sources of 
differences in costs between contract jurisdictions.   
  
 
 
                                                          
3 In the UK this did not deter new entrants – if they get it really wrong, they bow out of the contract and it is retendered.  It is a 
steep but fast learning curve with information out there on successful contracts to use for information.  Having said this, it does 
lead to less stable outcomes in the short run. 
4 Although it has been shown in Holland, Paris, and the UK that patronage surveys of an ongoing nature are acceptable as a way 
of allocating revenue.  In Sydney, for example, gross contracts still seem to inhibit integrated fare because of the unsubstantiated 
claim by government that different modes ‘need’ to have receipt of the flagfall fare component.  
5 We acknowledge the advice of John Stanley. 
6 As an example of a not uncommon situation, in a recent contract we are aware of, a bidder came in 10 percent 
under the incumbent on a contract and the tendering Authority rejected it, using evidence on best practice. 
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2. A proposed simplified model 
We start with the assumption that an Authority would define the budget (B) for services 
(regardless of whether a contract is gross or net), set minimum standards (X) and a growth 
target (G). The minimum standards would be based on passengers per bus kilometre (or 
passengers per operating hour to allow for traffic congestion), as the key objective of service 
delivery. We also assume that bidders (if competitively tendered) or negotiators (typically an 
incumbent) would have access to ‘relevant and reliable’ data on the current services and 
patronage on which to base their ‘offer’ to the Authority.7
The offers should be in the form of required compensation per passenger, which should be 
indexed for inflationary changes (using standard indices) and the specific operating 
environment, as defined by conditions such as speed (based on average timetabled speed), 
spread of service hours, and bus utilisation.  The point of these adjustments is to focus on the 
‘offer’ where efficiency and effectiveness of service provision is under the control of the 
operator, and to standardise the offers for factors outside the operators ‘control.  This is justified 
in more detail as follows
  
8
• Average speed.  Slower average peak speed, due to traffic congestion and/or an inefficient 
on-board fare payment system (see Tirachini and Hensher 2010), for instance, will typically 
increase driving time and operating costs
:  
9
• Spread of operating hours.  A higher ratio of timetabled operating hours during periods 
when penalty rates of labour pay apply (e.g., weekends and possibly very early in the 
morning on weekdays (e.g., before 5 am)), will typically increase operating costs.
.  This speed can be either a peak speed or a speed 
for all services, where the latter may be a weighted average to reflect the distribution of 
average speeds by time of day if such data is available. 
10
• Average bus utilisation. A higher number of annual service kilometres per peak bus, 
because of higher timetabled route frequencies, will have the effect of diluting fixed costs.
 Non-
timetabled school services should be included (if they are part of a contract), since many 
operators are likely to have a high incidence of such activity. 
11
                                                          
7 If it is a negotiated context, then the incumbent is the same as the negotiating operator; if it is a competitive bid, then this is not 
the case. In some jurisdictions, historical patronage figures are available in the public domain or in a contract specification; but this 
is not common practice when the contract is being negotiated, as opposed to being subject to a competitive bid. 
 
However we recognise that only a small proportion of cost might be considered to be 
actually fixed (e.g., bus registration and third party insurance). Other overhead costs will 
8 The calculation of these influences will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example Transperth uses a simple model to 
calculate average speed using public timetables. This is an automatic output of their contract management model (TRIS), and 
leads to a simple contract adjustment every 12 months. One common way of calculating speed is as follows:  Distance, based on 
route bus kilometres services arriving at the terminal between 0700-0900 and 1500-1800 hours, is the road centreline from a GIS 
Spatial layer Map, calculated using the shortest path algorithm between stops. The elapsed time is the end of trip time minus start 
of trip time, and speed is the ratio of distance divided by travel time. To calculate the spread of service vehicles hours, one way is 
as follows: define route bus services (excluding school services) arriving at the terminus between the start and end times of 0000-
0700 hours, 0700 to 1900 hours, and after 7pm on weekdays, and separately for all of Saturday and all of Sunday. The publicly 
available timetable can be used to obtain actual hours of service and then the annual total hours can be calculated based on the 
number of School days, Weekdays, Sundays/Public Holidays and Saturdays. 
9 It could be argued that slower speeds can also be the result of poor timetabling practices, which are under the control of the 
operator. However we believe the impact of slower speeds imposed by external factors in the operating environment will dominate 
here. 
10 A greater spread of operating hours, along with increased midday off peak services, can allow the operator to build more 
straight, rather than broken shifts. This could lower wage costs per hour given wage agreements.  
11 We acknowledge that average vehicle utilisation could vary substantially over a contract period, especially in situations where 
for example government pumps extra buses into the network, but then restricting kilometres to those buses. For example, the 300 
growth bus strategy in Sydney targeted kilometres at the peak, and kilometres attached to the growth buses was often half the km/ 
bus of the existing fleet. 
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increase with activity (even if not in direct proportion), especially where there is a 
significant increase in kilometres suggesting bus utilisation on route buses is less likely to 
be under the operator’s control.  However, in some jurisdictions the peak includes the 
school peak. Efficient planning and scheduling by the operator can then have a major 
impact on the peak vehicle requirements (PVR) and therefore bus utilisation. In these 
situations there is a risk that a higher PVR will provide a higher cost per km simply because 
more buses have to be provided to handle the needs in this short peak. To account for this 
latter issue, we should include the PVR as a further adjustment of the operating 
environment. If there are mixed fleets, then a further adjustment may be required, whether 
due to maintenance and/or different ages of the fleet.  
These three operating elements (plus the PVR) are typically context-specific influences not 
under the control of the operator, and have been found by the authors to be the key drivers12 of 
the differences in gross cost per service kilometre and, to some extent, patronage. Each of these 
factors is directly impacted by the operator’s network plan, which is largely under the control of 
the regulator (certainly under route contracts, but also in most area-wide contracts). Statistical 
analysis in Australia, for example, has shown that average peak speed is a major influence on 
differences in gross cost per bus kilometre efficiency across contract areas within a given 
geographical location. The UK practice, prior to economic deregulation, calculated payments 
for network subsidies on the basis of $/km plus $/hour plus $/peak bus13
To enable government to budget effectively, while also recognising the need for sufficient 
financial flexibility to reward growth in patronage above baseline projections, the total contract 
value would have to be capped at a figure that represents an agreed growth target. This is a 
tricky area as most governments appear to budget on the assumption that their initiatives to 
promote public transport will not reach agreed targets, and are often surprised when growth 
actually occurs and leads to a demand for more resources. It has been our experience that 
growth can be extraordinarily variable on adjacent corridors, and is always far higher or far 
lower than expected. Predicting patronage appears to be a "black art" that no-one has a good 
handle on, except in an aggregated way (city wide). An "agreed growth target" should be a 
network target, and have the flexibility to handle variances between existing contractors. 
, confirming that these 
adjustments have long been regarded as sensible adjustments for key cost drivers..  
We assume that the operator would have relative freedom to plan services14
(i) Any decision to lower standards under the minimum set out in the contract would need 
agreement of the Authority;  
 except that: 
(ii) The Authority could require that services with lower passengers per bus kilometre (or per 
bus hour) be introduced either as a "kick start" or permanently, but only by paying fares 
that builds the patronage up to the defined (or agreed) minimum of passengers per bus 
kilometre (or per hour)15
(iii) The operator would have the freedom to grow services, with a requirement to note the 
priorities set by the Authority; and 
;  
                                                          
12 Although the cost of delivering services is influenced by many factors, we believe that we can capture the main elements in 
these three key influences that impact in a non-marginal way, and are also not able to be materially adjusted by the operator. That 
is, they are the result of the external environment, be it geographical, socio-economic, or institutional. 
13 We thank Chris Nash for reminding us of this practice. 
14 While recognising the increasingly political nature of bus services. 
15 Given that many cities are moving to centralised revenue collection by Government, and the use of city-wide smart cards, the 
actual "fare" has little meaning to the contractor. If these fares vary between types of travel, e.g., they are paid for initial boardings, 
but not subsequent boardings as in Perth, or there are differentials between types of passenger – e.g., adults and pensioners, 
then these differences will distort the way operators develop services. This "fare" is really a management tool for incentivising the 
contractors. 
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(iv) Where peak vehicle requirements are often dictated by the local market, this should be 
additionally included as recognition of the implications of PV requirements on bus 
utilisation. 
This approach, we suggest, should remove second guessing and detailed analysis, and sets all 
the right market signals. It motivates the operator, but also protects the authority. It is simple to 
bid (or negotiate), simple to assess, and simple to manage. In the right hands (always a caveat) 
this could lead to rapid progress towards the Authority's targets.  
This payment mechanism can be formally set out as follows (with bold elements set by the 
Authority). We develop the formula using $/bus km, but the approach can also use a more 
general cost formula which distinguishes costs in terms of $/km, $/hour and $/peak bus and 
which, if preferred, can be defined in terms of bus hours. The ultimate target in all cases is the 
identification of $/passenger. 
Define the Budget: 
B = $/passenger * number of passengers  (1) 
 
subject to  
 
passengers/bus-km ≥ X  (2) 
 
and 
 
Bmax= $/passenger * number of passengers* growth rate target (3) 
 
B, X, and growth rate target are set by the Authority. If passengers/bus-km is less than X, then 
a shadow fare will apply for the gap, as long as the regulator agrees on X16
The cost per passenger has to reflect the operating environment, and hence must be calculated 
from a formula that accounts for at least those contextual effects that the operator has little or no 
control over. This requires the application of a formula such as that given in (4). This formula is 
a way of recognising and allowing for differences in costs that vary by the hour and the peak 
bus requirement, that are the basis of payment models based on $/bus km plus $/bus hour plus 
$/peak bus. 
. The shadow fare 
might be defined as equal to the (actual fare * passengers per bus-km)/X. The number of 
passengers has to be predicted from previous periods (or demand studies in the case of new 
services), and agreed by all parties. A mix of passengers should be allowed for, including 
schoolchildren who in some jurisdictions travel for free on passes (and are treated as half fare). 
Passes on issue will have to be quantified in an appropriate way to obtain estimates of 
passengers/bus-km and this simplified contract provides an incentive to all parties to agree on 
this. 
 $passengers = � $bus km��passengersbus km �  
                      = f � average peak speed, spread of service hours,vehicle utilisation, peak vehicle requirements�  x Annual CPIadj (4) 
 
                                                          
16 Passengers per bus km can vary enormously over a common network, and there are always many politically valuable services 
that will have a very low passengers per bus km. There are areas where the variation in passengers per bus km between routes 
within one contract area is 10:1. However, we anticipate passengers per bus km would be agreed as applying to a network rather 
than an individual route. 
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CPIadj is the consumer price index adjustment factor per annum and must reflect important cost 
components such as wage and fuel costs. We recognise that indexation by the CPI is very 
inaccurate as a reflection of costs, especially when wages increase faster than the CPI, which is 
common in many jurisdiction (e.g., 1 to 1.5% per annum in Australia), and fuel can be very 
volatile.  An indexation approach that is more cost-specific, in general, should be used if it is 
available.17
Formula (4) would need to be calibrated on existing operator data to obtain estimates of 
unknown parameters that define the role of context-specific influences. Such data should 
desirably come from the local context (such as all operators in a particular city or region), and 
be collected through a benchmarking program, although this is somewhat rare in most 
jurisdictions.  If multi-operator data are used, then calibration will need to include the possibility 
of operator specific effects.  On the other hand, if multi-operator data are not available, then 
some independent advice will be required on what variations in cost per bus km and passengers 
per bus kilometre are associated with each of the factors in formula (4).  Alternatively, the use 
of extra-jurisdiction values could be used to open negotiations, particularly with incumbent 
operators.  It is most unlikely that operators would remain silent if they felt the formula, based 
on data from outside their environment, is ‘out of range’ for their operations.  For this reason the 
opening bid from the Authority, where no data exist in the operating environment, should be at 
the low end of what the Authority believes the relevant costs should be. 
  
$/passenger is a composite of $/bus km (i.e., cost efficiency) and passengers per bus km. (i.e., 
network effectiveness). These two key performance indicators (KPIs) are arguably the main 
drivers of performance, and hence contract specification and compliance. As an example of how 
the adjustment may work, let us assume we have two alternative calibrated models18
 The first calibration of gross cost per service km ($/bus-km) is the formula given in Table 1, 
where the parameters are illustrative
, in terms of 
the formulation of $/bus-km.  The rate per km payments (or translated to $ per passenger as 
shown in equation (4)) is expected to cover all expenses, i.e., variable expenses, overheads, 
depot rent, margin etc., and all annualised capital costs would be calculated using a depreciation 
formula (e.g., economic life assumptions) used by the regulator (and not a commercial rule 
based on how an operator wishes to finance and depreciate assets). 
19
Table 1:  Calibration of gross cost per service km ($/bus-km)* 
. 
Variable Calibration coefficient 
constant 4.908  
average peak speed -0.228 
bus kilometre -0.000055 
spread of service hours  7.359 
peak vehicle requirement 0065 
Operator specific dummy variable -0.0114 
                   *All parameters are statistically significant at 95 percent level of confidence. 
 
                                                          
17 However, a related issue here is subsidy leakage (and one of the strong arguments for economic deregulation).  Allowing for 
the specific effects of wage increases in particular means that there is less incentive for the operator to be harsh about trying to 
contain wages. 
18 The parameter estimates used are not exact for any specific operating context, but are indicative of what we believe are 
reasonable estimates in metropolitan Australia. 
19 The importance of noting the illustrative nature of the example is crucial.  To emphasise this, we might have also selected a 
situation where the passenger/bus km ratio is 1.4 (as in Adelaide). We have used 10 in our example, which may be too high in 
many situations.  
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-0.228 indicates that every increase in the average speed of one km/hour in the peak reduces 
gross cost per bus-km by $0.0228; -0.000055 indicates that every extra bus kilometre reduces 
gross cost per bus-km by $0.000055 (or 5.5 cents /1,000 additional kms.); 7.359 suggests that a 
ten unit increase in the proportion of service hours during weekdays after 7pm and weekends 
(e.g., from 0.2 to 0.3) increases gross cost per bus-km by $0.736; and 0.0065 indicates that one 
additional peak vehicle adds $0.0065 to gross cost per bus km., 4.908 is a constant reflecting, on 
average across all operators, the role of other factors, and -0.0114 is a constant specific to an 
operator that accounts for other influences that are variations around the average for all 
operators in the set, that are specific to the operator. 
To take a specific situation, assume that the average peak speed is 20kph, , average vehicle 
utilisation is 40,000 km per annum per bus, the spread of service vehicle hours is 0.3 (i.e., 30 
percent are after 7pm on weekdays plus all of Saturday and Sunday), the PVR is 80 buses, and 
the cost index adjustment is 1.02. Then the application of the figures in Table 1results in a gross 
cost/bus-km of (-0.01140 -0.0228*20 -0.000055*40000 + 7.359*0.2 + 0.0065*80 + 4.908) * 
1.02 = $4.32 per bus-km. Assuming average passengers/bus-km =10, the $/passenger estimate 
applicable in equations (1) and (3) is $0.432.  Given the total forecast patronage, the budget can 
be calculated, and given the Authority approved growth rate target, the maximum available 
budget can also be calculated for the Authority. 
To assess the realism of this simplified formula, we applied the formulae above using data from 
a number of operators in Australia and compared the $/passenger outcome with the estimate 
from actual operator data on a subset of the sampled operators. We found that the calibration of 
formula (4) shown in Table 1 was able to reproduce the actual amount of money received to 
within ± five percentage points20. Such a variation might reasonably be built into the margin 21
We also considered but rejected as inferior another way of establishing the cost efficiency 
component of the formula as a calibrated model, in which variations around the average 
performance of all operators in the predefined geographical context (formula 4) were identified.  
Each operator’s costs are then adjusted to take account of operator-specific influences on gross 
cost per bus-kilometre. This second specification of gross cost per service km ($/bus-km) is 
given as formula (5), with the actual calibrated model given in Table 2, excluding the peak 
vehicle requirement
. 
We therefore deem this adequate as a starting position for negotiation or bid assessment.  
22
 Gross cost per bus − km  
. 
 
 
= f
⎝
⎜
⎛
(Average operator peak speed − all operators averaged peak speed),
�Operator km
bus
−  average all operator km
bus
� ,.(operator spread of service hrs − average of all operators spread of service hrs )⎠⎟
⎞
  (5) 
 
  
                                                          
20 The data used is confidential; however we thank the specific operators for providing data to enable the calculations. 
21  
We received a comment that “5% error in reproducing actual payments would represent a substantial part of the operator margin 
of a third or more” (John Stanley, personal communication). We recognise there is a risk in this approach, and would prefer a 
mechanism where the onus is put on the operator to show why this approach should not be used.  This could be done in 
negotiation. In principle, if the operator cannot show this, how do they know their margin is affected? 
22 The peak vehicle requirement is only excluded because we have not identified a parameter estimate, but would otherwise be 
included in a real application. 
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Table 2:  Calibration of gross cost per bus- km ($/bus-km)* 
Variable Calibration coefficient 
constant 6.11187 
average operator peak speed – all operators averaged 
peak speed 
- 0.16843 
operator km/bus – average all operators km/bus -0.00015 
Operator spread of service hrs – average of all 
operators spread of service hours 
1.17412 
           Gross cost per bus-km* All parameters are statistically significant at 95 percent level of confidence. 
 
This model produces estimates of gross cost per bus-km that are close to current values with the 
values for each operator being calculated by the inclusion of an operator specific constant.  Most 
of the estimates vary by no more than 50c/km, (which might deemed substantial in a typical 
range of $3/km to $7/km) but whilst simple, this is less accurate than the formulation in (4) and 
Table 1 above.  
However, both approaches could be used in a benchmarking exercise in the sense of setting a 
cost efficiency level which would be expected if an operator were being assessed as if they were 
operating at best practice (replacing the ‘average for all operators $/bus-km’ with best practice 
level)23
3. Conclusions 
. This estimate is then multiplied by passengers/bus-km to obtain $/passenger, which 
together with forecast patronage, provides an estimated budget as a starting position for 
negotiation or bid evaluation.   
This paper promotes the idea that it is possible to develop a simplified formula for identifying 
the amount that a local bus operator should be paid under a gross or net contract to deliver a 
given level of service. The essential ingredients are few, but crucial:  these are the gross cost per 
bus-kilometre (or an equivalent measure based on bus kms, bus hours and peak bus 
requirements), the patronage per bus-kilometre, and the consequent cost per passenger. Given 
patronage forecasts, a contract budget can be determined. The gross cost per bus-kilometre can 
be established using local data on operators who provide similar services, adjusting for 
differences in the operating environment.  
We have shown that a simplified and transparent formula is possible, which has value as a 
reference point in negotiation of contracts, as first time or renewal, as well as in the assessment 
of bid offers under competitive tendering. Bus Associations can benefit by using this approach 
to advise potential operators entering into negotiations with government.  
Despite the appeal of this payment formula, with such simplification comes a potential risk 
associated with the factors that are not explicitly considered, that might also play a role in the 
cost/bus-km.24
                                                          
23 We recognise that benchmarking involves comparing not just operators but their operational area, and differences could and do 
derive from both. However, where multiple operators bid for an identical contract area, the price differences can be extraordinarily 
close - less than one percent between the incumbents, but with some real divergence (both ways) from new entrants. This is why 
incumbents have survived in most of the re-tenders in Perth and Adelaide, for example. In these situations the costs and risks of 
changing operators are greater than any benefit derived from the differentials in the tender price. 
 All other factors are embedded in the overall constant in formulae 4 and 5. To 
24 There are always variations between jurisdictions. Operators often use this argument as self justification. Once controls are 
used to measure variations in key inputs (e.g., the cost of fuel and wage levels) then we cannot see why there are any differences 
other than average operating speeds. The first two can be significant – often as high a differential as 15 percent between 
Australian cities, and movements in speed can have dramatic impacts on contracts. However if these are allowed for there is likely 
to be little difference between operating a bus in the different Australian capital cities, for example. We believe that the focus by 
some operators on their unique environment is a self-serving mythology to protect their profits, their inefficiencies and their 
security. If an operator can bid in a jurisdiction accounting appropriately for the cost of fuel, wages and average speed, then 
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resolve this, we could allow for operator-specific constants25
The payment model proposed in this paper fundamentally alters the whole net vs. gross contract 
discussion. The only real value of a net contract, from an operator’s perspective, appears to be 
the incentives it provides; in all other areas it is a negative (e.g., co-ordinated planning, 
integrated ticketing, transparent tendering), although such negatives are positives for 
government. Given that the proposed model has a built-in incentive for both operator and 
regulator, it can replace both net and gross contract models. While the cost/passenger approach 
does not shift the revenue risk to the operator, if payment is based on that measure, since the 
negotiating framework is premised on agreed cost outcomes and agreed forecasts of network 
patronage (with initial estimates of patronage per operator). Fares can accommodate variations 
in patronage that have been agreed in advance and so the operator carries no revenue risk.  On 
the other hand operators are incentivised to build patronage through the agreement of targets.  
Importantly too there could be possibilities to modify the final contract where shortfalls in 
patronage from the starting base have a different marginal impact on what the operator receives 
from increases.  Fundamentally this is an important issue in an environment where it is difficult 
for operators to adjust their frequency and/or network in response to declining patronage or in 
an environment where overall patronage is falling.  
 (as shown in Table 1) if we have 
data of sufficient quality to be able to allow for unique constants (normalised as zero for one 
operator). Given the confidential nature of data that is likely to be required, the use of operator-
specific constants by the regulator is certainly feasible, but could not be made available to all 
operators, incumbent or otherwise, and would require some careful consideration of the 
suitability of such constants in situations that are likely to vary in the presence of another 
service provider. 
A hope is that the ideas in this paper might move the debate away from the controversial debate 
on tenders vs. "trusted partnerships" towards how to use the way the private sector works to 
maximise the benefits to government and the community. In addition, given what we believe are 
the key drivers of cost efficiency (or cost per vehicle km or hour),  we must express caution 
about the existence of factors that drive costs that cannot be simply and objectively measured 
(recognising the dominant role of fuel, wages, and average speed). This may minimise the need 
for benchmarking in order to make assessments.  Time will tell. 
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benchmarking best practice would be identified, which may be better than benchmarks existing with all incumbent operator’s in 
protected domains. Vested interests do not like this. 
25 One consultant stated: “I quite like the idea of operator-specific constants as putting the blow torch on the tails of the 
distribution”. 
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